外挂技术-逆向解密存放物品CALL缓冲区结构

时间：2015-02-03 15:02:33 阅读：161 评论：0 收藏：0 [点我收藏+]

学习目标：
     分析解密存放物品CALL缓冲区结构

一、分析物品存放功能:一次存放N个物品
+12 //8byte 来源于物品对象+4C
+1A //存放的物品数量

+2A //12字节可能是物品ID
+32 //8byte 来源于物品对象+4C
+3A //物品数量上限 2字节
+43 //物品在背包里的下标

//存放指令 //买出存取
//物品ID 告诉服务器我要存放是什么物品
//物品数量

BYTE nbData[0x90]={
0x00,0x00,0x94,0x00,0x84,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x2B,0x0C,
0x17,0x24,0x6A,0xCA,0x9A,0x3B,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0xAA,0xE2,0x99,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB7,0xBC,0x14,0x40,0x1A,0x41,
0xED,0x19,0x6A,0xCA,0x9A,0x3B,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7A,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x01,0x0B,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x4F,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0xAB,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x27,0x3A,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0F,0x1C,0x28,0x00,0x00,
0x00,0x00,0x1C,0x29,0x12,0x20,0x2D,0x0E,0x1A,0x26,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00};

_asm
{
  push 0x86
  lea ecx,nbData
  push ecx
  MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[0xF28700]
  mov eax,0x04A6690
  call eax
  }

//金创药(大) 2
$ ==>    >00 00 94 00 84 00 01 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 2B 0C  ..??......+.
$+10     >17 24 67 CA 9A 3B 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00  $g蕷;.........
$+20     >00 00 AA E2 99 00 00 00 00 00 63 4C AA BB 09 44  ..?....cL.D
$+30     >ED 19 67 CA 9A 3B 00 00 00 00 5C 01 00 00 00 00  ?g蕷;....\....
$+40     >00 00 01 1B 00 00 01 00 4F 90 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....O?.....
$+50     >00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
$+60     >00 AB 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 27 3A 00 00  .?.........‘:..
$+70     >00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0F 1C 28 00 00  ...........(..
$+80     >00 00 1C 29 12 20 2D 0E 1A 26 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..) -&......

//回城符泫勃派 3
+44
$ ==>    >00 00 94 00 84 00 01 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 2B 0C  ..??......+.
$+10     >17 24 6E CA 9A 3B 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00  $n蕷;.........
$+20     >00 00 AA E2 99 00 00 00 00 00 39 0F 32 D4 17 46  ..?....92?F
$+30     >ED 19 6E CA 9A 3B 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00  ?n蕷;.........
$+40     >00 00 01 1F 00 00 01 00 4F 90 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....O?.....
$+50     >00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
$+60     >00 AB 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 27 3A 00 00  .?.........‘:..
$+70     >00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0F 1C 28 00 00  ...........(..
$+80     >00 00 1C 29 12 20 2D 0E 1A 26 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..) -&......

0074F380  |.  8948 38       MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+0x38],ECX
0074F383  |.  8B96 28020000 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+0x228]
0074F389  |.  A1 249A1C03   MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[0x31C9A24]
0074F38E  |.  83C2 2C       ADD EDX,0x2C
0074F391  |.  6A 3C         PUSH 0x3C
0074F393  |.  8950 3C       MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+0x3C],EDX                     ;  dc [[0x31C9A24]+410+4*0]+5c
0074F396  |.  8B0D 249A1C03 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[0x31C9A24]                    ;  仓库背包基址
0074F39C  |.  68 C097AF00   PUSH Client.00AF97C0                                ;  UNICODE "*"
0074F3A1  |.  885D FC       MOV BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-0x4],BL
0074F3A4  |.  E8 57880300   CALL Client.00787C00

007A03C1  |> \8993 9C170000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+0x179C],EDX
007A03C7  |.  898B A0170000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+0x17A0],ECX
007A03CD  |>  8DB3 8C170000 LEA ESI,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+0x178C]                   ;  找EBX来源 ebx=[仓库列表基址] dd 0x31C9A24
007A03D3  |>  A1 4C9B1C03   MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[0x31C9B4C]
007A03D8  |.  8B15 B4E5F902 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[0x2F9E5B4]                    ;  Client.0099E2AA
007A03DE  |.  8985 EED7FFFF MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0x2812],EAX                   ;  +06 //4字节 00000001
007A03E4  |.  A1 B8E5F902   MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[0x2F9E5B8]
007A03E9  |.  B9 20000000   MOV ECX,0x20
007A03EE  |.  8DBD F2D7FFFF LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0x280E]                   ;  +0A //0x20*4
007A03F4  |.  C785 EAD7FFFF>MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0x2816],Client.00840094       ;  +2 //4字节 0x00840094
007A03FE  |.  F3:A5         REP MOVS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI],DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
007A0400  |.  8995 0AD8FFFF MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0x27F6],EDX                   ;  +22 //4字节 DWORD PTR DS:[0x2F9E5B4]
007A0406  |.  8985 0ED8FFFF MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0x27F2],EAX                   ;  +26 //4字节 DWORD PTR DS:[0x2F9E5B8]
007A040C  |.  68 86000000   PUSH 0x86
007A0411  |>  8D8D E8D7FFFF LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-0x2818]                   ;  缓冲结构首地址
007A0417  |.  51            PUSH ECX
007A0418  |>  8B0D 0087F200 MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[0xF28700]
007A041E  |.  E8 6D62D0FF   CALL Client.004A6690                                ;  存仓库 N个数量
007A0423  |.  8BCB          MOV ECX,EBX
007A0425  |.  E8 D69EFEFF   CALL Client.0078A300
007A042A  |.  E9 6E050000   JMP Client.007A099D
007A042F  |>  8B15 1C9AF200 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[0xF29A1C]                     ;  Case 11 of switch 0079FEFE
007A0435  |.  81C2 3C010000 ADD EDX,0x13C
007A043B  |.  52            PUSH EDX
007A043C  |.  E8 599F1900   CALL Client.0093A39A
007A0441  |.  83C4 04       ADD ESP,0x4
007A0444  |.  85C0          TEST EAX,EAX

标签：外挂 c++ 逆向游戏外挂辅助技术

原文地址：http://blog.csdn.net/mc_cc1/article/details/43449841

踩

(0)

评论一句话评论（0）

分享档案

更多>

2021年07月29日 (22)
2021年07月28日 (40)
2021年07月27日 (32)
2021年07月26日 (79)
2021年07月23日 (29)
2021年07月22日 (30)
2021年07月21日 (42)
2021年07月20日 (16)
2021年07月19日 (90)
2021年07月16日 (35)

周排行